Provisions in a Will Forfeiting the Share of a Contesting Beneficiary by Weaver, Frank Parks
Washington Law Review 
Volume 3 Number 1 
3-1-1928 
Provisions in a Will Forfeiting the Share of a Contesting 
Beneficiary 
Frank Parks Weaver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank P. Weaver, Notes and Comments, Provisions in a Will Forfeiting the Share of a Contesting 
Beneficiary, 3 Wash. L. Rev. 45 (1928). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/4 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
to lead to an overruling of at least one other earlier case on its
facts, namely, the Anderson case,57 where the defendant was en-
gaged in handling the liquor but not in making actual sales, which
evidence, under the facts of the case, seems just as direct proof of
the knowledge of the conduct of the place for the purpose of the
sale as an actual sale, it being borne in mind at all times that proof
of an actual sale is not necessary to prove the defendant a jointist, s
a fact winch the court at times appears to have overlooked.5  More-
over, the facts set forth in State v. Perrmn8 0 would almost appear
to be such direct proof of knowledge as to exclude, under the pres-
ent theory of the court, any additional circumstantial evidence to
the same end.t
AixRED E. HAEsCH.
PROVISIONS IN A WILL FORFEITING THE SHARE OF A CONTESTING
BERNIiARY'l-Provisions in will forfeiting the share of a contest-
ing beneficiary are not contrary to public policy 2 It is suggested
by the English courts that no question of public policy is involved,
that the court has no interest whatever apart from the interests of
the parties themselves, and that it matters not to the state whether
"Note 36, supra.
"See note 45, supra, second paragraph.
'See note 33, supra, and especially State v. Stuttard, cited therein.
127 Wash, at pp. 194-195.
t After this note had gone to press, the court, in a decision handed
down on March 19th, 1928, State v. Wilson et al., 47 Wash. Dec. 120, held
reputation evidence inadmissible as against the appellant, proprietor and
operator of a hotel wherein sales were proved by employees; no sales were
proved by the appellant although court below found that he participated in
and had knowledge of the handling of liquor in the hotel. The opinion is
short and relies upon a citation of the Radoff and Espeland cases and
states: "Again we announce the rule that reputation evidence is not ad-
missible in cases of this character, where there is direct and positive testi-
mony showing knowledge on the part of the owner or proprietor." No
attempt is made by the court to explain this holding, which without doubt,
throws greater doubt upon the earlier cases, criticized above; the conclu-
sion reached in the foregoing discussion seems to now have support in
tis decision, although, unfortunately, the court does not make more than
a general statement supporting the opinion which it hands down.
3For form of clauses see: 1 CuTLER's TiFAwy FoRm Boox 2139 (no
provision for gift over) 1 NICHOLS' ANNo. FoRms 2267, sec. 157 In re
Ohappel's Estate, 127 Wash. 638, 221 Pac. 336 (1923) In re Bergland's
Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 Pac. 277, 5 A.L.R. 1363 (1919) In re Kitchen's
Estate, 192 Cal. 384, 220 Pac. 301, 30 A.L.R. 1008 (1923) In re Keenan's
Will, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N. W 1001, 42 A L.R. 836 (1925) Cook v. Turner,
15 M. & W 727, 71 Rev. Rep. 808 (1846).
'Rogers v. Law, 66 U. S. 253, 1 Black 253, 17 L. Ed. 58 (1862)
Smithsonan Institution 'a. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 18 Sup. Ct. 396, 42 L. Ed.
793 (1898) In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443, 21 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 953 (1909) In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842, 23
L.R.A. (N.S.) 868 (1909) In re Sh rley's Estate, 180 Cal. 400, 181. Pac.
777 (1919) In re Bergland?'s Estate, note 1, supra, In re Kitchen's Estate,
note 1, supra, Moran v. Moran, 144 Ia. 451, 123 N. W 202, 30 L.R.A.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the devise or bequest is enjoyed by the heirs or the beneficiaries.'
No court has held the forfeiture clause void ab snitso.' In writing
the opinion of the court in 1853 but in expressing a personal view
not sanctioned by the majority, the chancellor of South Carolina
said that such a clause is void as "trenching on 'the liberty of the
law ' "I This view has not been followed.
Although not void ab snitso, the other extreme has been reached
in two states6 and approached in two others.' The forfeiture clause
is given effect under all circumstances when the will is contested.
These courts8 contend that no satisfactory reason has been ad-
vanced why a literal interpretation should not be given to the
express intention in the will. To read in any exceptions to for
(N.S.) 898 (1909) Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun. N. Y.) 546, 14 N. Y.
Supp. 28, 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 431 (1891) Whitehurst v.Gotwalt, 189 N. C. 577,
127 S. E. 582 (1925) Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. Rep. 419
(1869) Appeal of Chew, 45 Penn. (9 Wright) 228 (1863) Breithaupt v.
Bauskett, 18 S. C. (1 Rich.) _Eq. 465 (1845) Rouse v. Branch, 91 S. C.
111, 74 S. E. 133, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1160, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1296, 12 CoL.
L. REV 754 (1912) Sherwood v McClaurin, 103 S.C. 370, 88 S.E. 363
(1916) Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W 839, 26 A.L.R. 755 (1922)
Ferry v. Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 114 S. W 897 (1908) Massie v.
Massse, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617, S.W 218 (1909) Cook v. Turner, note 1,
supra, 28 R.C.L. 315, 40 Cyc. 1705, 2 PAGE ON WILLS 1920.
1 Cook v. Turner note 1, supra. Approved in Evanturel v. Evanturel,
6 P.C.A. 1 (1873). Schouler claims that Cook v. Turner is dictum because
the will had not been admitted to probate and would seem to be out-
weighed by Rhodes v. Mauswell Hill Land Co., 29 Beav 560, 54 Eng. Rep.
745 (1861) SCHOULER ON WILLS (6th ed.) 1344. JARMAN ON WILLS (6th
ed.) 1549 says Cook v. Turner stands for the proposition that the condi-
tion is operative for realty if there is no devise over.
This, however, has been suggested by dictum in Jackson v. Wester-
field, 61 Howard (N.Y.) Prac. 399 (1881) Rhodes v. Mauswell Hill Land
Co., note 3, supra, In re Kathan's Will, 141 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1913) See
also In re Keenan's Will, note 1, supra, Mallett v. Smith, 6 Rich (S.C.)
Eq. 12, 60 Am. Dec. 107 (1853) Dissenting opinion. Moran v. Moran.
note 2, supra. For discussion see 7 VA. L. REV. 64.
See note 4, supra. Mallett v. Smith, note 4, supra. The majority of
the court held there was no gift over of the legacy and decided on the
general rule applicable to legacies.
Chancellor Wardlow criticised Cook v. Turner note 1, supra, in re-
gard to public policy. "It is the interest of the state that every legal
owner should enjoy his estate."
Conditions of forfeiture "trenching on the liberty of the law" and
contrary to public policy are those in restraint of trade, agriculture, mar-
riage, and the like. For discussion of distinction see Cook v. Turner note
1, supra, Hoit o. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. 588, 7 Atl. 856, 59 Am. Rep. 43 (1886)
Rouse v. Branch, note 2, supra.
In re Gareelon's Estate, 104 Cal. 570. 38 Pac. 414, 32 L. R. A. 595, 43
Am. St. Rep. 134 (1894) In re Hite's Estate, note 2. supra, In re Miller's
Estate, note 2, supra, in re Bergland's Estate, note 2, supra, In re Shir-
ley's Estate, note 2, supra, in re Kitchen's Estate, note 1, supra, Moran v.
Moran, note 2, supra,
I Hoit v. Hoit note 5, supra, Kayhart v. Whitehead, 77 N. J. Eq. 12,
76 Atl. 241 (1910), Aff'd 78 N. J. Eq. 580, 81 Atl. 1133 (19113; Bradford v.
Bradford, note 2, supra, Thompson v. Gaut, 82 Tenn. 310 (1884) But see
Tate v. Camp, (Tenn.) note 2, supra.
8Note 6, supra.
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feiture is to substitute the views of the court for a clearly express
intent of the testator to the contrary 0
These clauses, as conditions subsequent, 0 go to defeat a vested
estate. Equity abhors a forfeiture, the law never enforces them
when it can be avoided. 1  Although held valid,'12 subject to certain
exceptions, the great weight of American authority holds that such
forfeiture clauses are not favored and are to be strictly construed.' 3
A discussion, then, of their effectiveness devolves into a consid-
eration of the exceptions and their application to devises and be-
quests. The cases are not in harmony,' 4 nor can the conflicts be
reconciled.
By the weight of authority, when the forfeiture clause treats
of personalty, the contesting legatee forfeits his share when there
is a gift over'2 of the bequest to the residuary clause or to a third
person, providing the contest is not based upon probabilis causa
littgandi and the contesting legatee is not an infant.
The condition requiring a gift over of the legacy before the clause
is effective has slight foundation in logic. There is respectable
authority denying the exception and holding that in the absence of
a gift over, the clause is effective and not considered M terrorem.'
9In re Miller's Estate, note 2, supra.
1In re Hite's Estate, note 2, supra.
"Ayer's Adm. 'v. Ayer, 212 Ky. 400, 279 S. W 647 (1926).
"Note 2, supra.
uAyer's Adm. v. Ayer note 11, supra, Jackson v. Westerfield, note
4, supra, In re Grote Estate, 2 Howard (N. Y.) Prac. (N. S.) 140 (1885)
Woodward v. James, 44 Hun. (N. Y.) 95 (1887) In re Stewart, 5 N. Y.
Supp. 32- (1889) Bryant v. Thompson, note 2, supra, In re Jackson's Will,
20 N. Y. Supp. 880, 47 N. Y. St. Rep. 443 (1892) In re Baradon's Estate,
84 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1903) In re Wall, 136 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1912) In re
Kathan's Will, note 4, supra, Appeal of Ohew, note 2, supra, In re White's
Estate, 2 Penna. Dist. Rep. 207 (1893) In re White's Estate, 163 Penna.
388, 30 Atl. 192 (1894) Rouse v. Branch, note 2, supra, Dutter V. Logan.
137 S. E. 1 (W Va. 1927).
II "Out of this confusion of authority there can come only a balanced
negation, an equality of sounds which produces silence. There is a
precedent for every inconsistent solution of the question, but prescript
for none." Ketcham J., in In re Wall, note 3, supra.
i Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, note 2, supra, Wright v. Cum-
mns, 108 Kas. 667, 196 Pac. 246, 14 A. L. R. 604 (1921), Whitehurst v.
Gotwalt, note 2, supra, Hoit v. Hoit, note 5, supra, Jackson v. Westerfield,
note 4, supra, In re Rezgle's Estate, 32 N. Y. Supp. 168, 65 N. Y. St. Rep.
247 (1894) In re Wall, note 13, supra, In re Arrowsmith, 147 N. Y. Supp.
1016, 162 App. Div. 623 (1914) In re Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 165 N. Y.
Supp. 71 (1917) In re Kozley, 171 N.Y. Supp. 669 (1918) In re Marshall's
Estate, 196 N. Y. Supp. 330 (1923) Brown v. O'Barn, 199 N. Y. Supp. 824
(1923) Appeal of Chew, note 2, supra, Rouse v. Branch, note 2, supra,
Sherwood v. McLaurzn, note, 2 supra, Fifield v. Van Wyfk Ex'r., 94 Va.
557, 27 S. E. 446, 64 Am. St. Rep. 745 (1897) In re White's Estate, note
13, supra, Clevear v. Spurling, 2 P. Wins. 526, 24 Eng. Rep. 846 (1729)
Lloyd v. Spillett, 3 P. Wins. 344, 24 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1734) Morns. -v. Bur-
roughs, 1 Atk. 399, 26 Eng. Rep. 253 (1737).
"In re Hite's Estate, note 2, supra, Moran v. Moran, note 2, supra,
In re Stewart. note 13, supra, Bradfordv . Bradford. note 2. supra, Thomp-
son v. Gault, note 7, supra, Massie v. Massie, note 2, supra.
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The majority of the courts hold that a gift over is sufficient evi-
dence of the intention of the testator that the clause was not to be
in terrorem, and, since the estate vests in the residuary legatee on
the happening of the contest, the court will not act to divest title.
If the intent of the testator is to control, it is difficult to say that
he meant the clause to be in trrorem since he failed to express a
gift over
The fallacy in the reasoning is apparent when it is noted that
the same courts give effect to the forfeiture without gift over when
it is attached to realty There is no basis in logic for the distinc-
tion. It is an anomaly in the laws of wills. Its introduction into
the common law and the reason for its adoption is historical.17
In England legacies could be sued for and recovered in the
ecclesiastical courts which followed the rules of the civil law re-
quiring a gift over When jurisdiction over legacies was also as-
sumed by Chancery, the civil law was followed as to legacies while
the common law was adopted as to devises in order that there might
not be a conflict of decisions in the two courts."8 The reason for
the distinction does not exist in the United States. It should not
be followed.
Keeping in mind that forfeiture clauses are to be strictly con-
strued,"9 the requiring of a gift over of personalty is valuable in
furnishing the court with an excuse for not enforcing the for
feiture when, under the facts before it, its enforcement would be
inequitable. The position a court will take when considering the
question for the first time, will be influenced, no doubt, by the
peculiar facts presented in the first case. A careful analysis of the
cases shows that the equities involved in the facts in the first case
before each court have had more weight than the academic ab-
stract logic as to the reasonableness of the theoretical distinction
between realty and personalty 20
Interpreted in the light of strict construction, it has been held
that not only is a residuary clause insufficient gift over,-" but that
a declaration that a forfeiture legacy is to fall into the residue is
also not sufficient.22 The courts of Pennsylvania and North Caro-
lina have expressed themselves to the contrary and suggested that
the testator's direction that a forfeited legacy is to fall into the
residue of his estate is sufficient gift over 28 Granting that a gift
over is necessary, it is submitted that an express gift to the residue
meets the requirement and gives effect to the testator's wish.
' See cases cited in note 16, supra. See also note, 68 L. R. A. 451.
See In re Dickson's Trust, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 37, 61 Eng. Rep. 14 (1850)
" See note 13, supra.
See 12 Am. B. A. J. 236.
2 In re Arrowsmith, note 15, supra, In re Title Guaranty & Trust
Co., note 15, supra.
' Brown v. O'Barn, note 15, supra, Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r., note
15, supra.
' Whitehurst v. Gotwalt, note 2, supra, Appeal of ClPew, note 2, supra,
but see In re White's Estate, note 13, supra.
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When the legatee has probabilis causa lit gandi for contesting
the will, even.though such contest is unsuccessful, it does not work
a -fortfeiture.2- This exception has been adopted by ten jurisdic-
tions, unpliedly rejected by one ;25 and definitely refused by two. 20
The majority contend that to hold otherwise would not only work
manifest injustice but would accomplish results no rational testa-
tor would ever contemplate. If undue influence or fraud is suc-
cessfully exerted over one about to execute a will, that same influ-
ence will write into it a clause which will make sure its disposition
of the alleged testator's property If the testator is insane or un-
duly influenced, then the instrument is not his will and his inten-
tion is not defeated by allowing a contest. The legitimate object
of the forfeiture clause is to prevent vexatious litigation. It has
been suggested27 that a devisee who takes under a will knowing
or having reasonable grounds to suspect that the will is a forgery,
becomes, morally a partsceps cretonss, and yet, being unwilling
to so remain silent, he is confronted with the alternative of forfeit-
mg his benefit for sporsormg a disclosure. The law prescribes who
may make, and in what manner a will may be made. Whether the
law has been followed is a question for the court. In bringing a
contest based upon probable cause, the contestant is aiding the
court to determine the validity of the alleged will. The court must
have the true facts from those who are in the best position to know
them.28
The authorities to the contrary" are not without reason. To
permit contests breeds family antogonisms, exposes family secrets
better left untold, in many cases attacks the character of the tes-
tator when he is unable to defend humself, and squanders the
estate itself. No such exception as probabsTis causa littgandi is
mentioned in the mill. To permit it is to allow the court to sub-
stitute its view for a clearly expressed intent of the testator to
the contrary In criticizing the leading Pennsylvania case"0 sup-
"In re Chappel's Estate, note 1, supra, Smithsonsan Institution v.
Meech, note 2, supra, South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn 168,
101 AtI. 961, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1090 (1917) Whitehurst V'. Gotwalt, note 2,
supra, Jackson v. Westerfield, note 4, supra, Appeal of Chew, note 2,
supra, In re Friend's Estate, 209 Penn. 442, 58 A. 853, 68 L. R. A. 447
(1904) Rouse v. Branch, note 2, supra, Tate 1. Camp, note 2, supra,
Dutter v. Logan, note 13, supra, Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90, 23 Eng. Rep.
668 (1668) Lloyd v. Spillett, note 15, supra, Morros v. Burroughs, note 15,
supra.
" Hoit v. Hoit, note 5, supra, Kayhart v. Whitehead, note 7, supra.
0 1n re Miller's Estate, note 2,, supra, In re Bergland's Estate, note
2,supra, Moran v. Moran, note 2, supra.
"Rouse v. Branch, note 2, supra.
"South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, note 24, supra, see dissenting
opimon Moran v. Moran, note 2, supra.
-See notes 25 and 26, supra.
301n re Friend's Estate, note 24, supra.
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porting probable cause, Justice Angellotti of California said .31
"It is a mere attempt at an artificial distinction to avoid the
force of a plain and unambiguous condition against contest."1
3 2
The Iowa court"3 points out that the question the legatee has to
decide is the ordinary one which arises in nearly every busi-
ness transaction-whether the thing offered is worth the price de-
manded.
What constitutes probabilis causa lit.gandi is a mixed question
of law and fact. 4 The question only arises after an unsuccessful
contest. It follows, if the exception is adopted, that unsuccessful
litigation does not conclusively prove the contest vexatious. Ad-
vice of counsel,35 and the testator having previously been adjudged
insane,3 6 have been held sufficient probable cause to prevent for
feiture. What probable cause is turns on the facts of each case.
No general rule has been laid down for its determination.
It is submitted that to deny forfeiture when the contest is made
in good faith is the better rule and protects the testator against
fraud, undue influence, and forgery, while at the same time, it
more nearly effects his intent. It is the rule adopted in Wash-
ington.3 7
Only two jurisdictions have passed on the exception of holding
the forfeiture clause inoperative when the contestant is an in-
fant." The New York court supports it on the theory that it
would be contrary to public policy to deprive the court of the
duty placed upon it by law for the protection of its infants. In
Kentucky this distinction has been refused. It is pointed out that
it is within the discretion of the court to refuse or to pernt the
guardian to sue for the infant. By the guardian's election to
take under the will, the infant is not precluded from contesting
31 In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119. 103 Pac. 842, at page 844, 23 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 868 (1909).
"See In re Bergland's Estate, note 2, supra, where the California
court was forced to hold that the forfeiture provision had no applica-
tion to an attempt made in good faith, although unsuccessful, to probate
what purported to be a later will. The doctrine of probabilis causa liti-
gandi would have saved embarrassment. See In re Kirkholder's Estate,
117 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1916).
"Moran v Moran, note 2, supra, Massie v. Massie, note 2, supra.
1" Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 184, 8 Otto 187, 25 L. Ed. 116 (1879).
IDutter v. Logan, note 13, supra.
6 Jackson v. Westerfield, note 4, supra.
"In re Chappel's Estate, note 1, supra.
'Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Ky. 30, 203 S. W 856 (1918),
Opinion extended. 181 Ky. 566, 205 S. W 564 (1918) Woodward v.
James, (dictum), note 13, supra, Bryant v. Thompson, note 13, supra.
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upon attaining majority as such is a personal right. He will,
however, have to render an accounting for benefits previously re-
ceived under the will.
When the forfeiture clause is annexed to a devise, it is effective
unless there is a probabilis causa litigandi or the contestant is an
infant. There need be no gift over 39 This is not only recognized
by the states refusing the distinction between personalty and
realty,40 but also by those jurisdictions requiring a gift over in
the case of personalty 41 It is submitted that since there should
be no distinction between realty and personalty in enforcing or
refusing a forfeiture, and since no logical reason exists in America
for requiring a gift over when annexed to a bequest, the rule as
stated for devises should be the true one applicable to both devises
and bequests. The exceptions of probable cause, and the con-
testant being an infant, apply in the same manner to devises as to
bequests.
The determination of whether the will has been contested or not
within the meaning of the forfeiture clause, is dependent, to a
great extent, upon the particular equities involved in the facts
of each case, and, upon the attitude of the court regarding the
validity of the clause in general. Courts which have previously
committed themselves by favoring the clause and permitting for-
feiture, escape their position in certain cases by holding that no
contest, within the meaning of the testator, has taken place. The
word "contest" is given legal significance.
42
It is generally held that a suit for the the construction of a will
is not a contest.43 Its object is to determine the intent of the tes-
tator-not to defeat it. The filing of a caveat is not sufficient
contest."4 Although a legatee who aids and abets a contestant
forfeits bis share under the will,4 5 a legatee does not incur a for-
"Wright v. Cummins, note 15, supra, Sackett v. Mallory, 42 Mass.
355 (1840) Hoit v. Hoit, note 7, supra, In re Arrowsmith, note 15, supra,
Whitehurst v. Gotwalt, note 2, supra, Thompson v. Gaut, note 7, supra,
Massie v. Massie, note 2, supra, Dutter v. Logan, note 13, supra.
'0See cases cited in note 16, supra.
"See cases cited in note, 15, supra.
"In re Hite's Estate, note 2, supra, Contra: Moran v. Moran, note 2.
supra.
"Black v. Herring, 79 Md. 146, 28 Atl. 1063 (1894) Perry v. Perry,
175 N. C. 141, 95 S. E. 98 (1918) Woodward v. James, note 13, supra.
"Drennen v. Heard, 198 Fed. 414 (1912) In re Mcahan's Estate,
221 Penna. 188, 70 Atl 711 (1908)
(1877).
"Drennen v. Heard, note 44, supra, Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501
(1877).
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feiture by voluntarily testifying in favor of a contesting heir and
admitting that he was in sympathy with him.46  Presenting a sub-
sequent will, in good faith, which is rejected, is not a contest.47
Filing a petition of contest which is later dismissed or withdrawn,
either with or without a settlement, is a contest within the mean-
ing of the clause.41 In Washington it has been held that one hold-
ing property by deed does not forfeit that same property by
contesting a will simply because it is also devised to him in a
will made after the deed.4 9  A claim against the estate is not a
contest5 0 A widow's unsuccessful suit for dower is not a breach
of the forfeiture clause because had she recovered, the will would
not have been broken.51 The beneficiaries under the will are the
only ones able to claim a forfeiture. If they do not so claim, the
executor cannot object.5 2  In general, a contest within the mean-
ing of the forfeiture clause is that which goes to defeat the tes-
tator's intention. 0
In summary, a provision in a will forfeiting the share of a con-
testing beneficiary is not contrary to public policy When such a
provision treats with personalty, the contesting legatee forfeits
his share when there is a gift over of the bequest to the residuary
clause or a third person providing the contest is not based on
probabilis causa litsgandi, and the contesting legatee is not an
infant. A few jurisdictions deny the exceptions. When the for-
feiture clause is annexed to a devise, it is operative unless probable
cause exists, and the contestant is not a minor. The probable
cause exception has been refused by two jurisdictions.
It is submitted that there should be no difference in the rules
applicable to realty and personalty No reasons present them-
selves to justify the distinction of requiring a gift over in one
instance and not in the other. The better and more logical rule
for all property is that applicable to devises, repudiating the neces-
sity of a gift over for personalty, and recognizing the exceptions
4'Haradon v. Clark, 190 Ia. 798, 80 N. W 868 (1921) Richards V.
Piefer 229 Mich. 609, 201 N. W 877 (1925) Scott v. Ives, 32 N. Y. Supp.
168 (1898) For consptring to contest, see In re Largue's Estate, 198 Mo.
App. 261, 200 S. W 83 (1918)
I4n re Bergland's Estate, note 2, supra, In re Kirkholder's Estate,
note 32, supra.
" In re Arrowsmith, note 15, supra, Tate v. Camp, note 2, supra.
4"White v. Chellew, 108 Wash. 628, 185 Pac. 621 (1919).
50 Wright v. Cummns, note 15, supra.
51Harber v. Harber 158 Ga. 274, 123 S. E. 114, 33 A. L. R. 598 (1924)
Williams . Williams, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea.) 438 (1885).
51 See notes in 5 A. L. R. 1370" 14 bid. 609" 26 ibid. 764.
RECENT CASES
of probable cause and minor contestants. However, if the will is
so worded as to make acquiescence to the will by the legatee a
condition precedent to the bequest, the probable cause exception
is not applicable because the provision against contest is not a
forfeiture provision but a conditional limitation upon making the
bequest in the first place-"- This offers also a means of evading
the arbitrary rule applicable to bequests in requiring a gift over
FRANx PARKS WEAvER.
RECENT CASES
AUTomOBiEs-DuTY OF CrrY TOWARD UxLIcENsED AuTomoBMrE TO MAIN-
TAIN SE rrs. The plaintiff brought suit against the city to recover for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident alleged to have been
caused by the failure of the city to provide sufficient guard rails on a
bridge. The automobile was not registered as required by law, and con-
sequently its operation on the highway was in violation of the statute pro-
viding that no motor vehicle should be so operated until properly reg-
istered. Held: The plaintiff was a trespasser on the highway to whom
the city owed no duty to keep the streets reasonably safe, and in the
absence of such duty, the fact that there was no causal connection
between the illegal operation of the vehicle and the injury was immaterial.
City of La Junta v. Dudley, ... , Colo .......... 260 Pac. 96 (1927).
This case follows the doctrine laid down in Maine in the leading case of
McCarthy v. Inhabitants of Leeds, 115 Me. 134, 98 Atl. 72, L. R. A. 1916E,
1212 (1916) and reaffirmed by the same court on several occasions. In
Maine, as in the principal case, recovery is denied only in actions against
municipal corporations or other public bodies charged, with the duty of
maintaining the highway in a safe condition. Massachusetts extends the
rule so as to deny recovery in all cases. Doherty v. Ayer, 197 Mass. 241,
83 N. E. 677, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816 (1908). Cases holding the contrary
of both the Maine and Massachusetts doctrines are: City of Huntsville
v. Phillips, 191 Ala. 524, 67 So. 664 (1914), Church v. Kansas City, 280
S. W 1053 (Mo. App. 1926) Phtpps v. Perry, 178 Iowa 173, 159 N. W 653
(1916) HersvTan v. Roane County Court, 86 W Va. 96, 102 S. E. 810
(1920).
No case squarely in point has as yet been decided in Washington.
On similar facts recovery has been had against private parties in State 'v.
Switzer, 80 Wash. 19, 141 Pac. 181 (1914) and Johnnsson v. American
Tug Boat Co., 85 Wash. 212, 147 Pac. 1147 (1915). In Koch v. Seattle, 113
Wash. 583, 194 Pac. 572 (1921), the plaintiff recovered from the city, but
the defense involved the violation of a city ordinance requiring a driver's
permit for persons under the age of eighteen. The present Washington
statute, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 6362 (P C. § 234-2) differs slightly from the
one in the principal case by providing that any violation of the licensing
law shall be a misdemeanor, rather than expressly prohibiting use of an
unregistered vehicle. Some distinction has been drawn in some of the
decided cases between these different types of statutes, but this would seem
to be an unwarranted refinement of interpretation. Considering the fact
that licensing laws were passed primarily for purposes of revenue and
identification, it logically follows that both prohibitory and punitive
statutes were meant to effect enforcement of the law, rather than govern
U Cook v. Turner, note 1, supra, See 12 Am. B. A. J. 236.
